ter-the-fact judicial review of election procedures. In its fair and bal anced exposition of prior precedent and the legislative history of the key provisions upon which the Supreme Court purported to rely in Bush v. Gore, When Elections Go Bad provides the Court with all the rope it needs to hang itself. 5 Yet the book's very structure implies that Bush v. Gore reflects the dilemmas that generally and inevitably arise when courts are asked to adjudicate election disputes. It does not. Bush v. Gore is sui generis. Because of its remarkable role in deciding a remarkable election, however, the case is clearly worth studying closely, apart from any general lessons one might choose to draw from it. Although When Elections Go Bad presents the courts as struggling with recurring di lemmas, its real strength is the light it sheds on the performance of the U.S. Supreme Court in the Presidential election of 2000.
In Bush v. Gore, the Court's most conservative Justices announced an interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause so broad that, if gen erally applied, it would sweep aside election procedures in a majority of American states. A manual recount of punch card ballots was held unconstitutional because the statutory phrase "intent of the voter" was deemed insufficiently precise to constrain the discretion of vote count ers.6 Yet three fundamental errors marred the Court's analysis.
But perhaps not all the rope that one might want. In my view, the book edits Bush v.
Gore a bit too severely. This is my only quibble about the editing, and, happily, the authors will correct the defect in a second edition of When Elections Go Bad, already nearly com plete as this Review goes to press. 6. 531 U.S. at 105 ("The recount mechanisms implemented in response to the decisions of the Florida Supreme Court do not satisfy the minimum requirement for non-arbitrary treatment of voters necessary to secure the fundamental right. Florida's basic command for the count of legally cast votes is to consider the 'intent of the voter.' This is unobjectionable as an abstract proposition and a starting principle. The problem inheres in the absence of specific standards to ensure its equal application."). The Florida Supreme Court's holding, Gore v. Harris, 772 So. First, the majority Justices apparently assumed that the alternative to an imperfect manual recount was a perfect measure of the will of the Florida electorate. Yet intercounty variations in the accuracy with which different forms of balloting recorded voters' intent dwarfed the variations introduced by the ambiguity of the recount standard.7 The Court brushed aside this concern through pure ipse dixit. 8
Second, the Justices themselves bore substantial responsibility for the Florida Supreme Court's failure to specify substandards for gaug ing "intent of the voter." In its first foray into the 2000 Presidential election, the U.S. Supreme Court cautioned the Florida Supreme Court that the latter should hew closely to the letter of Florida stat utes, lest it be found to usurp the role of the Florida legislature under Article II, section 1, clause 2 of the Constitution and 3 U.S.C. § 5.9 By the time the case made it back to the U.S. Supreme Court less than a week later, only three Justices were willing to endorse this view,10 but by then the damage had been done. The Florida Supreme Court had been intimidated into ordering a recount under the unembellished statutory standard of "intent of the voter." This time the Florida court was reversed for failing to gloss the statute. Heads Bush wins; tails Gore loses -or so it appeared.
Third, and perhaps least justifiably, the U.S. Supreme Court de termined that the counting had to cease at midnight, December 12, 2000, barely two hours after it issued its decision. The Court located this deadline in what it termed the Florida Supreme Court's statement "that the [state] legislature intended the State's electors to 'partici pat[ e] fully in the federal electoral process,' "11 by taking advantage of the safe harbor 3 U.S.C. § 5 provides against challenges in Congress. Yet Florida's statutes nowhere stated a preference for the safe harbor deadline over an accurate count, nor did the Florida Supreme Court ever attribute such a preference to it.12 Even Florida Supreme Court Justice Shaw, who dissented from his court's December 8 decision or-7. For example, the optical-scanner vote-counting system used in forty-one of Florida's sixty-seven counties resulted in only a 0.3% undervote rate, compared to a 1.5% rate in counties using punch card ballots. See Gore in lines of cases with a less partisan.bent,22 and undoubtedly the Justices saw themselves as simply performing their duty .. Yet the pure heart defense only goes so far. Ultimately, the Court must be judged by its deeds, not its motives.
II. ORGANIZATION
When Elections Go Bad fills a gap in the authors' casebook, The Law of Democracy.23 The latter "focused more on institutional ar rangements than on the nuts-and-bolts of casting votes and having them counted" (p. 2). The organization of When Elections Go Bad suggests that it is intended either as an extended supplement for a course in election law or as a stand-alone work on the law of the cast ing, counting, and litigating of votes. But the book's content and its timing -published less than a month after the Supreme Court's rul- Nevertheless, the authors have followed the usual course for case books, organizing the material thematically. The book consists of a short foreword followed by four chapters: (1) The Federal Interest in Election Procedures; (2) When Should Federal Courts Intervene?; (3) The State Interest in Federal Elections; and (4) Remedial Possibilities for Defective Elections.
Throughout the book, the authors use the 2000 Presidential elec tion to illustrate more general points about election law, but this seems backwards. Ordinarily, the case method of legal instruction uses individual cases to illustrate general propositions, because it is under stood that the general propositions are more important than any par ticular application. Not so here, where one application dwarfs all oth ers. For example, even assuming that punch card ballots remain in use for some substantial period, any future dispute over whether dimpled chads should count as votes is extremely unlikely to have anything like the significance it had in the 2000 Presidential election. The same is true of nearly every hotly contested issue in the postelection contro versy.
For telling the legal story of the 2000 Presidential election, a chronological organization might have served better.24 For one thing, it would have revealed just how much of the problem in Florida was due to the U.S. Supreme Court's mishandling of the case. In light of what came next, the Court's worst move may have been its initial decision to deny certiorari on then-Governor Bush's proposed third question: "Whether the use of arbitrary, standardless and selective manual re counts" violates the Fourteenth Amendment.25 Nearly three weeks elapsed between the certiorari denial and the Court's eventual ruling in Bush's favor on just that question.26 Had the Court handled the case more expeditiously from the start, there might have been time for a recount, even under the Court's stringent standard and made-up deadline.27
There is a certain logic to the postelection litigation as presented in When Elections Go Bad that belies the wild unpredictability of the postelection litigation process as it was experienced in real time. As I 24. The second edition will be organized more or less chronologically. have just noted, the Court's initial denial of review on the third certio rari question was, at the time, a partial defeat for Bush, although by dragging matters out it ended up immensely aiding him. Likewise, when the Florida Supreme Court ruled that Florida Secretary of State Katherine Harris lacked the discretion to exclude delayed returns from the certified total,28 the decision was· viewed as a major victory for Gore .29 Yet that decision ended up proving ruinous to his case for two reasons. First, by extending the protest phase of postelection challenges, the decision necessarily shortened the contest phase, thus enabling the U.S. Supreme Court to invoke the December 12 "dead line" at a point at which it was too late for anything to be done. Sec ond, in order to find that Harris was obligated to accept late returns, the Florida Supreme Court needed to construe Florida statutes crea tively -and its willingness to do so may have led five Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court to view all of the output of the Florida high court with extreme suspicion.30
III. H IGHLIGHTS OF W HEN E LECTIONS GO BAD
The two greatest strengths of When Elections Go Bad are the authors' illuminating notes and questions and the primary materials the book collects, including some marvelous tidbits.
My favorite passage is a quotation of Senator Sherman, the princi pal supporter of the 1886 Electoral Count Act, which includes the now-infamous 3 U.S.C. § 5. Explaining why Congress was the appro priate body to resolve a future dispute of the sort that arose in the Presidential election of 1876, Senator Sherman stated that he had con sidered lodging this power in the Supreme Court, but concluded that this would be unwise. He presciently explained:
It would be a very grave fault indeed and a very serious objection to refer a political question in which the people of the country were aroused, about which their feelings were excited, to this great tribunal, which after To similar effect is Fourth Circuit Judge Wilkinson's explanation in a 1986 case denying a civil RICO claim for damages brought by un successful candidates for state and federal offices in West Virginia. Af ter noting that the House of Representatives had then recently exer cised its power to resolve .a disput, e concerning the election of one of its members, he stated:
The partisan and acrimonious nature of that debate only reaffirms the wisdom of avoiding judicial embroilment and of leaving disputed politi cal outcomes to the legislative branch. Had the framers wished the fed eral judiciary to umpire election contests, they could have so provided. Instead, they reposed primary trust in popular representatives and in po litical correctives.32
Through their notes and questions, Issacharoff, Karlan, and Pildes sometimes suggest that they agree with Senator Sherman, Judge Wilkinson, and the original Framers that federal courts should not adjudicate after-the-fact election disputes, except perhaps as a last re sort. Yet that proposition is hardly obvious. As Senator Sherman him self observed, even in the nineteenth century, other democratic coun tries routinely assigned this function to their courts.33 In modern times, most democracies have seen fit to insulate the electoral process itself from politics by granting extensive powers to independent commis sions and courts.34 As a matter of first-order institutional design, this may well be the better approach. 2) India's 1947 Constitution created the Election Commission of India, an independent body whose members are appointed by parliament, serve for fixed, six-year terms, and are remov able only through impeachment. The Commission oversees voter and candidate eligibility, party registration, funding, balloting, and vote counting for the world's largest democracy. See Election Com mission of India, at http://www.eci.gov.in/infoeci/about_eci/abouteci_ fs.htm (last visited July 18, 2001 ).
3) The Australian Electoral Commission is another independent body charged with the oversight of democratic elections. The Commission is responsible for conducting all aspects of a national election. It maintains the electoral rolls and enforces the compulsory enrolment; promotes public awareness of electoral and parlia mentary matters; conducts research into electoral matters; publishes materials relating to the election procedures; and reports to the Minister on electoral matters .... The regulation of elections and election campaigns by the commission is for the purpose of not only producing As a descriptive matter, however, Issacharoff, Karlan, and Pildes are surely correct. Our Federal Election Commission is a very weak body with jurisdiction limited to enforcement of ineffective campaign finance laws,35 and, Bush v. Gore notwithstanding, Congress, rather than the Supreme Court, has primary responsibility for refereeing dis putes over the outcome of federal elections. This is not to say that American courts previously played no role in resolving elections. State courts in particular played a substantial one, even in federal elections. In its chapter on remedies, When Elections Go Bad gives two spectacular examples.
In one, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court examined the punch card ballots in a Congressional primary, counted dimpled chads under an intent-of-the-voter standard, and concluded that the candi date who had trailed by 175 votes after a machine count netted 376 votes, thus winning the election.36 In another, a California appellate court overruled a trial court because the latter had erroneously ap proved the inclusion in the total balloting of the vote of one citizen who had recently moved. Because that citizen had testified that he had voted in favor of the contested ballot initiative, his vote was subtracted from the total yes vote. Where the machine count had produced a two vote defeat of the initiative, and the trial court had converted that reequitable distribution with regard to represc;mtation, but also to encourage fairness in the competition process. This involves providing for neutral election officials, enforcing the laws against bribery, and misleading advertisements, and the regulation of financing for elections. 4) Japan's electoral laws are arguably the strongest of any modem democracy, but there is no independent agency charged with enforcing those laws. Sung Yoon Cho, Japan, in FOREIGN COUNTRIES, supra, at 126 ("Japanese election campaigns, including campaign fi nancing, are governed by a set of comprehensive laws that are the most restrictive among democratic nations."). Japan's courts, however, are given wide latitude to enforce election laws. See suit into a one-vote victory, the appeals court found a tie, meaning the initiative failed. 37
Although elections this close are no doubt unusual, it is precisely the close elections that lead to calls for recounts, and Issacharoff, Karlan, and Pildes describe the Massachusetts case, at least, as "fairly typical" (p. 126). They also describe manual recounts performed by the United States Senate that aimed to discern "the true intent of the voter," including a partial r, ecount .in 1974 (p. 27). Given such prece dents, the Bush v. Gore majority's consternation in the face of un guided discretion in the counting of punch card ballots is rather mysti fying. Were all of these prior recounts under similarly general criteria also unconstitutional? The Court did not say.
While much of the material presented in When Elections Go Bad undermines the arguments made by the Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore, the book opens with a line of precedent that arguably supports the Court. The first principal case is a 1995 Eleventh Circuit decision in which the court found a violation of due process where, in an elec tion for state offices, an Alabama court counted absentee ballots that had not been notarized or properly witnessed as required by Alabama election law.38 The court ruled that such . a "retroactive change" vio lated "fundamental fairness."39 As Issacharoff, Karlan, and Pildes ob serve, this very broad view of the role of federal courts with respect to state election law explains "why lawyers for the Bush campaign pressed so ardently to draw the Eleventh Circuit into the Florida dis pute" (p. 10). Yet even as the case casts light on the Bush litigation strategy, it poses a puzzle about the Supreme Court's behavior: Why did those Justices who ruled for Bush rely on unprecedented (and un persuasive) views of equal protection and Article II, when they might have invoked seemingly apposite due process precedent from the very circuit that encompasses Florida?
Through their questions and comments, lssacharoff, Karlan, and Pildes suggest an answer: the Eleventh Circuit's own rule would be un tenable if generally applied because it would threaten to federalize every question of state election law. In the Alabama case itself, the federal district court and Eleventh Circuit detected a clear break with prior consistent practice; by contrast, prior to the 2000 election, Florida's election laws had not been applied to a statewide electoral contest in over eighty years (pp. 17-20). Thus, a federal court judg ment that Florida had departed from its own laws would have rested on nothing but a disposition to read Florida statutes differently from the Florida courts. As lssacharoff, Karlan, and Pildes ask rhetorically, "if the federal courts can do no more than simply issue their own in terpretations of how· best to read state law, can such a difference of view ever rise to the level of the 'patent' unfairness that is required for a federal constitutional interest in the process?" (p. 20) . This is a fair criticism. A U.S. Supreme Court opinion relying on the Eleventh Circuit's due process rule would have been unjustifiable. Yet it would have been no more unjustifiable than the actual decision in Bush v. Gore, for the equal protection standard the majority an nounced also threatens to inject a federal issue into every state elec tion. Similarly, it is no less arbitrary for a federal court to substitute its reading of state law for that of the state courts under the nominal aus pices of Article II -as three Justices did in Bush v. Gore -than un der the Due Process Clause.
Perhaps the majority Justices relied on Article II and equal protec tion rather than due process because of the haste with which they needed to decide the case and issue their opinion. Bush v. Gore was handed down less than two days after it was argued. By way of com parison, even working at lightning speed, Issacharoff, Karlan, and Pildes took nearly two weeks from the date of the decision until they submitted their final manuscript to the publisher, whereas I spent a leisurely two and a half months working on this Essay, and the editors of the Michigan Law Review spent a still longer period editing it and checking citations. Given this upside-down allocation of time, it is not surprising that the Court's chosen legal theories do not survive close scrutiny.
In any event, to fault the Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore for pick ing one rather than another unconvincing doctrinal explanation for its decision misses the point. By December 12, 2001, five Justices appar ently believed that the Florida Supreme Court was determined to throw the nation into chaos rather than to let a Bush victory stand, and that they alone could rescue us. But the Court's conventions did not permit it to invoke such frankly pragmatic considerations, leaving it only inadequate doctrinal grounds to justify its action.40 40. I do not mean to suggest that the Court's hypothesized concern about stability was warranted. Had a recount left Bush in the lead, that would have been the end of the matter. Had Gore overtaken Bush, political pressure might have.forced a Bush concession, and if it had not, there is no reason to think that Congressional resolution of the election would have threatened the nation's stability. My point is that if the Court was "taking a bullet" for the country, it should have said so. For Cass Sunstein, the Supreme Court's initial unanimous per curiam remand to the Florida Supreme Court was a wisely "minimal ist" decision.41 This was a spectacularly poor assessment. By papering over internal divisions with an opinion that falsely suggested there were five Justices prepared to base their decision on a nonretroactivity principle rooted in Article II and 3 U.S.C. § 5, the minimalist character of the opinion wasted precious time and trapped the Florida high court. 42 For Jeffrey Toobin, the postelection litigation confirmed his view that the legal system and the political system had merged -for the worse.43 Toobin had previously identified that merger as the root problem with the events leading up to President Clinton's impeach ment.44 Yet in an important respect, the phenomena are almost polar opposites. In the impeachment iSaga, the Supreme Court stood by while politically motivated actors used the legal system for political gain.45 In the postelection litigation, the Supreme Court prevented both the state legal system and the state and national legal and politi cal systems from performing the roles assigned to them. Far from the culmination of a longstanding trend, Bush v. Gore was a shock to many of the most seasoned Court-watchers precisely because it ap peared to be political. Had law and politics really already merged in the way that Toobin claims, Bush v. Gore would have been under stood as simply business as usual.
In some sense, of course, Bush v. Gore was consistent with prior Rehnquist Court opinions. As Larry Kramer wrote in the wake of the Court's 5-4 decision to stay the manual recount but before its final ruling, "conservative judicial activism is the order of the day. The Warren Court was retiring compared to the present one."46 The point is a fair one,47 but neither the initial stay nor the ultimate disposition in Bush v. Gore was conservative in the conventional sense. By contrast, some of the Court's most activist, conservative decisions have actually frustrated the institutional interests of the Republican Party. Most prominently, the majority-minority districts that were invalidated by Shaw v. Reno48 and its progeny were frequently created with the blessing of southern Republicans who hoped to "pack" African Americans into such districts,' thereby dili.Iting the strength of the Democratic Party in the remaining districts.49 Whatever one thinks of the Rehnquist Court's activist pursuit of colorblind electoral district ing, it is activism in the service of a principle, not a party.
The authors of When Elections Go Bad do not entirely escape the tendency of other commentators to see in the 2000 Presidential elec tion a confirmation of their previously held views. The tendency is less pronounced, however, because the substantive views of the book's authors -who undoubtedly disagree among themselves on some key questions -are not entirely obvious. Indeed, writing in these pages two years ago, Burt Neuborne criticized Issacharoff, Karlan, and Pildes for failing to develop a normative account of democracy.50
Yet, as Neuborne's own review illustrates, the authors' first book did embrace a more limited theory, one of the proper role of courts in policing the democratic process. Neuborne thought that too much of the first book was devoted to the legal mechanisms by which minority voters may challenge electoral practices.51 This focus on the rights of minority voters is hardly disproportionate given the theory implicit in both The Law of Democracy and When Elections Go Bad -broadly speaking, the theory of the Carolene Products footnote,52 the Warren Court, and John Hart Ely's Democracy and Distrust.53 In a nutshell, courts can and should take action to assist democracy, but only when the democratic process cannot cure its own defects. And that circum stance is most likely to obtain when political divisions reflect racial ones.
Seen from this vantage point, the Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore was wrong because it was unnecessary. The Electoral Count Act meant that Congress could have resolved the matter with out judicial interference. Although lssacharoff, Karlan, and Pildes do not say so explicitly, their account also suggests that the Florida Supreme Court erred in ordering manual recounts given they believe that the Florida legislature was prepared to resolve the issue.
V. AN A LTERNATIVE I NTERPRETATION
Like the classical process theory of Carotene Products, Earl War ren, and John Hart Ely, the implicit process theory of The Law of Democracy and When Elections Go Bad envisions a circumscribed role for judges. It is not that Issacharoff, Karlan, and Pildes trust poli ticians. As they state very early in When Elections Go Bad, " [t] here is little reason to believe that partisan officials will cease to be that if they are given the chance to interpret or even alter the rules of the game after the election has occurred" (p. 3).
The problem for the authors of When Elections Go Bad is that "just as the partisan effects of all potential courses of action are known to partisan political officials, so too are they known to judges who must adjudicate electoral challenges. The adjudication of claims that will alter the outcomes of high-profile elections threatens significant damage to the integrity of courts" (p. 3). Given the choice between two flawed sets of institutions, why not have a strong presumption that matters should be left to the politicians, whose judgments are at least subject to review in the political process? That rhetorical question is the subtext of When Elections Go Bad.54 54. The authors' skepticism of federal judicial intervention is most apparent in their notes and questions on the demise of abstention doctrines in federal court decisions involv ing elections. Pp. 57-62. But do the facts of the 2000 Presidential election controversy really support the view that politicians are no worse than judges in referee ing electoral disputes? From the very beginning of the Florida recount imbroglio, elected officials consistently took whatever positions would advance the interest of their party's candidate. The Democratic Attorney General supported the Gore campaign.55 The Republican Secretary of State supported the Bush campaign: first she denied that she had any discretion to accept late votes;56 then when instructed that she had such discretion, she categorically declined to exercise it;57 and finally, when instructed that the categorical denial was abusive, she rigidly enforced a deadline so as to minimize Gore votes. 58 More ominously, the Florida legislature was fully prepared to take a party-line vote that would have given the state's electors to Bush, re gardless of the result of any court-ordered recount. 59 We do not know to a certainty that Congress would have acted in a similarly partisan (Vol. 99:1279 fashion, but perhaps that is only because the Supreme Court denied Congress the opportunity.
Although hardly above reproach, in general the courts did not act in quite so partisan a fashion as the politicians during the 2000 Presi dential election controversy. The Democratic trial judge who initially ruled that Secretary of State Harris had the discretion to certify late returns handed the Bush campaign a victory by subsequently ruling that she did not abuse her discretion in excluding those returns. 60 The heavily Democratic Florida Supreme Court was accused of partisan ship for its decision reversing that judgment,61 but the Florida Supreme Court itself later split on whether to order manual recounts in the con test phase, and that split was not on party lines.62 Even the Florida Supreme Court Justices who sided with Gore ordered a remedy that was hardly certain to result in a victory for him -manual counting of "under-votes" in counties that went for Bush as well as those that went for Gore.63
It is also worth noting that the U.S. Supreme Court Justices did not divide strictly on party lines. Republican appointees Stevens and Souter sided with Gore. In addition, although he would have ruled for Gore with respect to the remedy, Democratic appointee Breyer found some merit in Bush's equal protection argument.64 But even if one were willing to condemn the Court's majority for partisanship in Bush v. Gore, it would not follow that courts lack any systematic advantage over politicians. Federal judges are insulated from political pressure by life tenure and salary protection, while independence is a cardinal judicial virtue at all levels. Of course, any institutional arrangement can be subverted by human failings. The key question is what are the odds.
VI. C ONCLUSION
The United States Constitution was flawed from the outset -not just morally flawed because it condoned slavery, but institutionally in complete because of the Framers' failure to anticipate the develop ment of political parties. The two-party system arose in the United States partly as a response to Duverger's Law,65 but also to fill a prac tical need. The Madisonian strategy of dividing power to prevent tyr anny carries with it a well-known concomitant danger of government paralysis,66 as each institution frustrates the will of the others. By facili tating coordination among the branches and levels of government, po litical parties reduce the risk of gridlock. 67 The original Constitution's mechanism for selecting a President quickly broke down in the face of political parties, leading to the deadlocked election of 1800. Although the Twelfth Amendment remedied the particular problem that had caused the deadlock, politi cal parties continue to fit awkwardly in our constitutional system. This awkwardness is apparent in cases involving the institutional interests of parties as such,68 as well as in the 2000 Presidential election contro versy.
If elected bodies are assigned the task of adjudicating high-stakes partisan contests, there is a substantial risk that the political parties will capture the organs of government, converting the latter into mere agents of the former. Even if varied constituencies and shifting coali tions lead to bipartisan compromise on other issues, with respect to after-the-fact adjudication of close elections, party discipline will be the order of the day. The risk of capture appears to have been realized (Vol. 99:1279 in Florida, and likely would have also been realized at the national level, if given the chance.
The resulting battle of institutions was not, however, a classic in stance of Madisonian checks and balances, but more nearly its oppo site. The Madisonian system of checks and balances depends upon government bodies pursuing discrete institutional interests rather than the interest of whichever party happens to control a given body. For example, even when the same party controls the Senate and the House, legislation frequently passes one body but founders in the other, because House and Senate members are elected for different terms, serve different constituencies, and develop cross-party working relationships with different colleagues. When parties capture the insti tutions, however, the only question that matters is which party con trols the institution with the final move. In the case of the 2000 Presi dential election, the answer to that question was almost certainly the Republican Party.69
That answer is not in itself distressing, except to partisans. If party loyalty is ever going to take priority over institutional loyalty, it will be during partisan political contests. The problem arises because neither our Constitution nor our laws expressly provide for a neutral referee of partisan political contests.
Given this gap, it was understandable that a clear majority of Americans thought that the United States Supreme Court was the only institution with the detachment and prestige to resolve the elec tion dispute impartially.70 That it proved incapable of doing so con- 70. In a Gallup poll conducted between August 29 and September 5, 2000, 62% of Americans claimed they "approve[d] of the way the Supreme Court is handling its job." Forty seven percent of those surveyed claimed to have a "great deal" or "quite a lot" of con fidence in the Supreme Court, compared to 46% for organized religion, 64% for the U.S. Military, 24% for Congress, 42% for the presidency, and 36 % for the television news. Public Opinion of the Supreme Court, GALLUP NEWS SERVICE, at http://www .gallup.com/ poll/releases/pr001201b.asp (Dec. 1, 2000) . Interestingly, Gallup noted a sharply increased partisan divide in public perception of the Supreme Court following the decision in Bush v.
Gore:
Those who identify as Democrats showed a slight drop in confidence in the Supreme Court between June and December, from 44% with 'a great deal' or 'quite a lot' of confidence during June, to 40% during December. Independents also showed a very slight loss of faith in the Supreme Court as well, from 48% to 45%. Republicans, however, showed a large in crease in confidence, from 48% during June to 67% during the days following the Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore. In short, views of the nation's highest court became more politicized -at least in the short term -during the time period in which the court made the highly controversial decision that gave George W. Bush the presidency.
